ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS

In the ordinary exercise of its equity powers, a state court may enjoin
persons before it from proceeding in a court of another state.1 Similarly,
2
a federal court may enjoin proceedings before another federal court.
When both state and federal courts are involved, however, considerations based on the "independence" of the respective judicial systems
have given rise to a general "hands off" policy with regard to injunctions by one court to bar proceedings before the other.3 The prohi1 E.g., Cole v. Cunningham, 135 U.S. 107 (1890); O'Haire v. Burns, 45 Colo. 432,
101 Pac. 755 (1909); Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 35 NJ. 343, 173 A.2d
225 (1961). It is clear that a state court has no power to issue an injunction directly
restraining a foreign court. Sandage v. Studabaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 142 Ind. 148, 41
N.E. 380 (1895); Natalbany Lumber Co. v. McGraw, 188 La. 863, 178 So. 377 (1938).
However, the court can act in personam as to persons over whom it has jurisdiction
and who may be contemplating or prosecuting an inequitable suit in another state.
Cole v. Cunningham, supra. As a general rule, this injunction will only be issued
when both parties involved are residents of the state in which the enjoining court
is located. This requirement is based upon the difficulty in enforcement where nonresidents are involved and upon the feeling that the home state of a party can
best protect his rights. Thus, where both parties are non-residents courts will not
enjoin. Marquis v. Marquis, 121 N.J. Eq. 288, 189 Ad. 388 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936).
Courts have enjoined proceedings when one party is a non-resident if there is some
means of compelling his acquiescence or to prevent his taking inequitable advantage
of the injunction. Doerr v. Warner, 247 Minn. 98, 76 NAV.2d 505 (1956). See Note,
When Courts of Equity Will Enjoin Foreign Suits, 27 IowA L. Ruv. 76, 77-79 (1941).
All unqualified references to injunctions against "proceedings" in other courts herein
can be presumed to have the meaning of injunctions against parties' proceeding in
other courts.
2 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1961); Martin v.
Graybar Elec. Co., 266 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1959); Food Fair Stores v. Square Deal
Market Co., 187 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d
925 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813 (1942). If only federal courts are involved,
it appears that the grounds for an injunction to bar a suit may be much less stringent
than those where state courts are involved. In the National Equip. Rental case, the
only grounds discussed were those of concurrency of actions in two federal courts,
and the court held that the prosecution of a subsequent suit between the same parties
and on the same cause of action could be enjoined. These grounds are seldom, if ever,
sufficient between state courts. See text accompanying notes 36-38 infra.
3 Cases denying federal injunctions against state proceedings include Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955); Toucey v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Diggs
& Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807). Cases denying state injunctions
against federal proceedings include Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964);
Central Nat'l Bank v. Stevens, 169 U.S. 432 (1898); Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256
(1894); Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867); McKim v. Voorhies, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 278 (1812).
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bition against federal courts' enjoining state court proceedings has
always been statutory4 and is presently embodied in section 2283 of
the Judicial Code,5 while the state prohibition is the product of judicial
decisions.6
Despite this mutual "hands off" policy, however, it is clear that under
certain circumstances a federal court may enjoin proceedings before a
state court.7 On the other hand, as a result of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Donovan v. City of Dallas,8 it is also now clear that there
has been no reciprocal relaxation of the state bar. In fact, Donovan
sets forth this prohibition more absolutely and authoritatively than
ever before.
It is the thesis of this comment that the Donovan decision has reinforced, if not indeed created, an unnecessary and undesirable "double
standard" with regard to state and federal injunctive powers, and
that as a general proposition state courts should be able to enjoin
federal court proceedings whenever, in the converse situation, a federal
court could enjoin proceedings before a state court.9 To develop this
thesis, the comment will first set forth the equitable bases upon which
a state court may enjoin proceedings before courts of another state,
after which it will analyze the restrictions upon federal and state court
power to enjoin proceedings before each other. It will be suggested that
greater weight should be given these equitable standards, in determining
whether to issue an anti-suit injunction between state and federal courts.
I. ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS BETWEEN STATE COURTS
An injunction to bar the prosecution of an out-of-state proceeding

is a remedy issued with great caution by state courts.' 0 Such an in4 The statute was first enacted in 1793 (Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat.
334) and but for an exception as to proceedings in bankruptcy (REv. STAT. § 720
(1875)) remained unchanged until 1948.
5 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958).
6 See, e.g., Central Nat'l Bank v. Stevens, 169 U.S. 432 (1898); Riggs v. Johnson
County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867); McKim v. Voorhies, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 278 (1812).
7 See text accompanying notes 72-116 infra.
8 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
9 This comment focuses on the criteria for and the desirability of injunctions between federal and state courts in actions in personam. Special areas such as those
involving the Federal Employers Liability Act and state or federal criminal proceedings
are beyond the scope of this examination. Also omitted is any detailed treatment of
the situation where both proceedings are in rem. In such cases federal and state
courts have long been able to enjoin proceedings before the other court when such
proceedings threaten the jurisdiction of the court first taking custody of the res.
See Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Lake Street R.R., 177 U.S. 51 (1900); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
10 A court must "exercise exceeding care with full realization of those acts of
international courtesy between courts and their like desire to do equity between
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junction may well antagonize and offend the foreign court. Furthermore, it infringes on a party's right to bring suit on a transitory cause
of action in any court in which jurisdiction over the defendant and the
subject matter may be obtained.1 Thus, to justify the anti-suit injunction, there must be present equitable factors which go beyond the
12
expense and inconvenience of having to defend a suit in a distant state.
These factors must overcome the normal presumptions that the plaintiff
is bringing the foreign suit in good faith and on a bona fide cause of
action, and must serve to establish a danger of "immediate and irreparable harm" to the equity plaintiff.'3 The primary advantage of
the injunction, as compared with such other possible remedies as a
refusal to appear and subsequent collateral attack, lies in its immediacy
and greater assurance of success, together with its adaptability to meet
the needs of the particular case.
If situations involving in rem jurisdiction are omitted,14 most of the
cases employing injunctions seem to fall within one or more of the
following four categories: (1)prevention of needless and repetitious
relitigation; (2) protection of the equity plaintiff from fraud or collusion
in the foreign suit; (3) prevention of attempts by the foreign suitor to
evade or thwart local law by seeking to obtain a more favorable law
elsewhere; and (4) prevention of multiple and duplicative actions,
particularly when brought only to vex or harass.
A. Relitigation
When a case has been finally adjudicated by a state court, that court
may enjoin a losing party from attempting to evade that judgment by
re-opening the cause in a court of another state. 15 For such an inlitigants." Labak v. Graznar, 54 Ohio App. 191, 194, 6 N.E.2d 791, 792 (1935). See
also Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 35 N.J. 343, 357, 173 A.2d 225, 232
(1961); Childress v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 235 N.C. 522, 70 S.E.2d 558 (1952).
11 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss, 277
Ill.
383, 115 N.E. 554 (1917).
12 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Reddick, 202 Ark. 393, 150 S.W.2d 612 (1941);
Boston & Me. R.R. v. Whitehead, 307 Mass. 106, 29 N.E.2d 916 (1940).
13 See, e.g., Oates v. Morningside College, 217 Iowa 1059, 252 N.W. 783 (1934);
Wabash Ry. v. Peterson, 187 Iowa 1331, 175 N.W. 523 (1919). The prevention of
"irreparable harm," of course, is the normal test required for any injunction and is
not peculiar to the anti-suit injunction. See, e.g., Watkins v. Ruppert, 224 F.2d 47
(2d Cir. 1955).
14 See note 9 supra.
15 O'Haire v. Burns, 45 Colo. 432, 101 Pac. 755 (1909); Oates v. Morningside College,
217 Iowa 1059, 252 N.V. 783 (1934); Gordon v. Munn, 81 Kan. 537, 106 Pac. 286 (1910).
Similarly, a state court should be able to enjoin a winning party from relitigating
the action on the grounds that he had already recovered full satisfaction and that
the subsequent action was dearly brought to vex or harass. This situation is not
one that often arises.
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junction to issue, it is necessary that there be an identity of issues and
parties in both actions,16 and it will issue even though the judgment
17
in the first suit would be res judicata in the second.
Although the courts refer to upholding their own adjudicative
powers in these cases, the basis of the injunction is primarily equitable.
A showing of an intent to vex or harass or to obtain a new hearing
on the same cause in a distant state indicates an absence of good faith
or lack of a bona fide cause of action, and it has been held that to
require the equity plaintiff to travel to the foreign state, if only to
enter a plea of res judicata, constitutes undue hardship, for which an
injunction is an appropriate remedy. 18
m 9
The case of O'Haire v. Burns
' provides a good example. A suit
involving Colorado mining claims was litigated in a Colorado court.
The defendant prevailed. Thereafter, obtaining personal jurisdiction
over the defendant while he was temporarily in Iowa, the defeated
plaintiff attempted to relitigate the same cause in an Iowa court. The
defendant obtained an injunction from the Colorado court barring
the plaintiff in the Iowa action from prosecuting that suit. The Supreme
Court of Colorado affirmed the issuance of the injunction, stating:
The decree in this case does not attempt to enjoin or control
the Iowa court in any manner, and is not a refusal to give that
full faith and credit to its judicial proceedings as contemplated
by the Constitution of the United States, but is simply a decree
restraining one of our own citizens from attempting to do that
which is wrong, unlawful, against good conscience, stating
when, and providing a method whereby there is, can, and should
be, an end to litigation between- citizens of our own state as to
20
matters accruing therein.
16

Cf. Southern Calif. Petroleum Corp. v. Harper, 273 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1960).

A -plea of res judicata requires an appearance in the foreign suit, causing harm
in the form of unnecessary expense, inconvenience in travel, and loss of time. Furthermore, a plea of res judicata is much less certain than an injunction-it may not be
timely or otherwise may not succeed. The enjoining court, having previously adjudicated the case on the merits, would seem in most cases to be in a better position
to determine the extent and nature of duplication. Cases involving problems created
by reliance on res judicata in this context include Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
308 U.S. 66 (1939) and Barr v. Thompson, 350 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). In
Phoenix Fin. Co. v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 115 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1940), one of
the cases involved in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), a plaintiff
who had irrevocably lost in the federal court thereafter instituted five separate suits
on the same cause in state courts in Delaware. In one of the five the plea of res
judicata failed, although the facts were substantially the same in all the suits. See
IA MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrTCE 0.208[2], at 2311 (2d ed. 1961).
18 See, e.g., Oates v. Morningside College, 217 Iowa 1059, 1066, 252 N.W. 783, 786-87
17

(1934).
39

20

45 Colo. 432, 101 Pac. 755 (1909).
Id. at 441, 101 Pac. at 757.
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Even though the first judgment could be pleaded in bar in the Iowa
suit, the court stated that to require the defendant in that suit to
travel five hundred miles to a foreign jurisdiction, when all the parties,
witnesses and the property in question were native to Colorado, would
be indefensible. The court also expressed the fear that if the injunction
had been denied, the defeated plaintiff could have continued to sue
on the same cause of action in any jurisdiction in which personal
jurisdiction over the defendant might have been obtained.
The anti-suit injunction to prevent relitigation, as used in O'Haire,
seems a necessary and desirable means to prevent inequity. When
properly based, its advantages outweigh whatever interference and friction it may cause.
B. Fraud or Collusion
State courts may enjoin parties to out-of-state suits where such suits
were part of a general scheme to defraud the equity plaintiff2 l or where
jurisdiction over him was obtained through fraud.2 2 Determinative here
is the desire of the enjoining court to prevent fraud or collusion and
to protect persons within its jurisdiction from being called many miles
at considerable expense to defend fraudulent actions.2 3 In Reed v.
Hollingsworth,2 4 for example, the directors of a Colorado corporation
had acted in collusion with the vendor of land to the corporation to
permit a forfeiture of the land. Thereafter, the directors, residents
of Iowa, repurchased the land individually at a greatly reduced price
and brought an action in Colorado to quiet title against the corporation.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in connection with a general derivative
suit, held that the Iowa shareholders could obtain an injunction to bar
the prosecution of the Colorado suit. The use of the injunction in
such cases seems proper.
Similarly, since judgments obtained through fraud or collusion are
21 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890); Reed v. Hollingsworth, 157 Iowa 94,
135 N.W. 37 (1912); Child v. Henry, 183 Minn. 170, 236 N.V. 202 (1931).
22 Greer v. Cook, 88 Ark. 93, 113 S.W. 1009 (1908); Usen v. Usen, 136 Me.
480, 13 A.2d 738 (1940); Cameron & Co. v. Abbott, 258 S.W. 562 (Tex. Civ. App.

1924). In Morad v. Williams, 177 Misc. 933, 32 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1942), a New

York court enjoined a New York resident from suing another New York resident in
Florida for alienation of the affections of the equity defendant's wife, such actions
being valid in Florida but contrary to the public policy of New York. In part, the

New York court based its injunction on the ground that the equity plaintiff had
been induced by the defendant to come with him to Florida to recuperate from illness
and that he was promptly served with process on arrival.
23 The showing of fraud in the foreign suit vitiates the normal presumption that
that action was brought in good faith and on a bona fide cause, and thus supports
the conclusion that to compel a resident to defend such actions constitutes undue
hardship. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
24 147 Iowa 94, 135 N.W. 37 (1912).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 32.471

considered void,25 their enforcement has been enjoined. 26 Even in
such cases, however, courts have limited the use of injunctions to situations where there is a showing that the winning party is actively enforcing the fraudulent judgment to the immediate and irreparable
harm of the defendant and that the courts where such enforcement
is sought are unable or unwilling to act. 27 In some cases courts have

enjoined the use of fraudulent documents or other limited aspects of
a foreign suit,28 but since the parties are already before the foreign

court and the facts of such fraud can be revealed to it, considerations
of comity and logic would seem to weigh against such injunctions.
C. Public Policy
When a party sues in a foreign court in order to evade local laws,
whether procedural 29 or substantive, 30 courts have frequently enjoined
the institution or prosecution of the suit. Before issuing the injunction,
25 See Weimar v. Weimar, 25 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1940); cf. Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915).
26 E.g., Engel v. Scheuerman, 40 Ga. 207 (1869). A distinction, perhaps not wholly
viable, has been drawn in these cases between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. Generally,
extrinsic fraud is fraud involved in the obtaining of a judgment concerning a transaction, while intrinsic fraud goes to the transaction itself. The general feeling is that
the adjudicating court can best rule as to intrinsic fraud and objections are waived
once judgment is entered, while extrinsic fraud renders the judgment void and open
to collateral or direct attack, including an injunction to bar its enforcement. See
60.24, 60.36, 60.37, at 245-57, 601-35 (2d ed. 1955);
7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACE
Note, 48 IowA L. Rav. 398 (1963).
27 Normally, appeal in the court where the judgment was rendered is the proper
remedy in this situation. However, fraudulent judgments often go by default, and
enforcement may be sought either in the defendant's home state or in other states
where he is vulnerable. In such cases factors such as distance, expense and the fact
that appeal is no longer available in the forum state are relevant to the issuance
of an injunction. In Second Nat'l Bank v. Thompson, 141 N.J. Eq. 188, 56 A.2d 492
(1947), the New Jersey court enjoined enforcement of a New Jersey judgment which
the victorious party in a Pennsylvania suit had obtained by pleading that judgment,
obtained through fraudulent use of the default process. However, as there was no
showing of immediate harm since the victorious party was not actively attempting
to enforce the Pennsylvania judgment, the court refused to enjoin there, noting that
"the Chancery Courts of Pennsylvania are also courts of conscience and there is no
showing that defense cannot be there made and adequately passed upon." Id. at 202,
56 A.2d at 501.
28 Child v. Henry, 183 Minn. 170, 236 N.W. 202 (1931) ("wilfully false, sham, and
fraudulent" counterclaim); cf. Twaits v. Pennsylvania R.R., 77 N.J. Eq. 103, 73 Atl.
1010 (1910) (fraudulently obtained release).
29 Pere Marquette Ry. v. Slutz, 268 Mich. 388, 256 N.W. 458 (1934); New York,
C. & St. L.R.R. v. Matzinger, 136 Ohio St. 271, 25 N.E.2d 349 (1940).
30 Sandage v. Studabaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 142 Ind. 148, 41 N.E. 380 (1895); Keyser
v. Rice, 47 Md. 203 (1877); Dehon v. Foster, 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 545 (1862). A difference
only as to procedure or rules of evidence has generally been held not to warrant the
issuance of an injunction. See Standard Oil Co. v. Reddick, 202 Ark. 393, 150 S.W.2d
612 (1941); Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Ashelman, 300 Pa. 291, 150 At. 475 (1930).
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the local court must determine from the facts of the situation that its
own law will not be applied and that this will unduly prejudice the
32
31
In
rights of the defendant.

Weaver v. Alabama Great So. R.R.,

for example, an injunction was granted restraining an Alabama resident
from suing an Alabama corporation in a Georgia court on a collision
occurring in Alabama. The plaintiff had chosen the Georgia jurisdiction
because Alabama decisions had established as a rule of law that a driver
who failed to stop, look and listen for a train was guilty of contributory
negligence, while in Georgia it was clear that such evidence would
merely go to the jury together with all other evidence. In issuing
the injunction, the Alabama Supreme Court stated that "it is clear that,
by resorting to the Georgia court for the enforcement of his alleged
claim against complainant, respondent seeks an adjudication thereof
under a theory of the law which denies to complainant the benefit of
a perfect legal defense which would be available to him in Alabama
33
courts, a result which is offensive to justice and equity."
In cases where the foreign suit appears otherwise to have been brought
in good faith and the only alleged basis for the injunction is that the
substantive law of the foreign state differs from that of the local state,
the injunction ordinarily will not issue, since it is assumed that the forum
court will apply the appropriate law to the case. 34 Nevertheless, equitable
factors such as the motive of the plaintiff, trial expenses, unavailability
of witnesses, and time and distance have been deemed sufficient to
justify the issuance of the injunction in some of these cases. 35
31 Weaver v. Alabama Great So. R.R., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917); Natalbany
Lumber Co. v. McGraw, 188 La. 863, 178 So. 377 (1938); Sharp v. Learned, 185 Miss.
872, 188 So. 302 (1939). This is not an easy determination. Under traditional choiceof-law rules a court will apply the law of the place of the making of the contract or
of the place where the tort occurred. Modern courts, however, have modified this in
terms of "interest apalysis" and "significant contacts." In general, where a court is
uncertain as to what law the adjudicating court will apply, and in the absence of
other strong equitable grounds, no injunction should issue. See Royal League v.
Kavanagh, 233 Ill. 175, 84 N.E. 178 (1908). In connection with "interest analysis," see
generally B. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study of Conflict-of-Laws Method,
25 U. Cm. L. REv. 227 (1958).
32 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917).
33 Id. at 435, 76 So. at 367.
34 Bank Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Wood, 122 Kan. 831, 253 Pac. 431 (1927); Bigelow
v. Old Dominion Mining & Smelting Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 457, 71 Ad. 153 (Ch. 1908);
Buchanan-Vaughan Auto Co. v. Woosley, 218 S.W. 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). In the
case of procedural law, under standard choice-of-law rules, the law of the forum is
appropriate. However, when this will result in depriving a defendant of rights
available to him if the suit had been brought in an "interested" state, courts of that
state may have a basis for an injunction, as in the Weaver case. See B. Currie, supra
note 31.

35 See Sandage v. Studabaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 142 Ind. 148, 41 N.E. 380 (1895);
Dehon v. Foster, 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 545 (1862); Dinsmore v. Neresheimer, 32 Hun. 204
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1884).
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The injunction on the grounds of public policy in cases such as
Weaver should depend on the proof of an intent to evade local law,
without justifiable reasons for bringing a suit in the foreign state. Moreover, for reasons of comity such an injunction should seldom, if ever,
be issued where the foreign state has contacts with the suit, other than
serving as forum, and thus reasonable grounds exist for the application
of its law.
D. Multiplicity of Actions and Concurrency
State courts generally will not enjoin parties within their jurisdiction
from prosecuting suits in more than one jurisdiction simultaneously. 36
Similarly, as a general rule, a state court will not enjoin a defendant
in an action before it from instituting his own suit on the same cause
in a second jurisdiction.37 This reluctance to enjoin is based on the theory
that each court is competent to hear the cause and that with a transitory
cause of action a party acting in good faith has "the legal right to bring
his action in any court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and
38
which can obtain jurisdiction of the parties."
Nevertheless, state courts having prior jurisdiction over the controversy have enjoined the prosecution of subsequent suits involving
the same parties and cause of action. Certainly, in accord with the
preceding analysis, an injunction should be available to prevent concurrent actions brought only to evade local law. More generally, however, anti-suit injunctions have been issued on a showing that the
subsequent suits were motivated only by a desire to vex and harass, and
thus were not brought in good faith. 39 However, state courts have also
36 E.g., Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss, 277 Ill. 383, 115 N.E. 554 (1917); Miller v.
Myers, 75 Misc. 297, 135 N.Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 151 App. Div.
438, 135 N.Y. Supp. 1128 (1912). On the other hand, as between two federal courts, the
mere fact of concurrent actions involving the same parties and the same issues has
been held sufficient to give rise to an injunction against the second proceeding. National
Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1961).
37 This constitutes what has been termed "reactive" litigation, as opposed to multiple
suits brought by the same party, which is "repetitive" litigation. See Vestal, Reactive
Litigation, 47 IowA L. REv. 11 (1961); Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IowA L. REV.
525 (1960).
88 Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss, 277 Ill. 383, 387, 115 N.E. 554, 556 (1917). In
addition to these general considerations there are situations where the second action
is clearly justified and duplication inevitable. An example may be where a creditor has
obtained security through attachment in the second jurisdiction which he did not have
in the first. See generally Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IowA L. REv. 11, 24 (1961);
Note, 60 COLUM. L. Rxv. 684, 698-709 (1960).
29 See Williams v. Payne, 150 Kan. 492, 94 P.2d 341 (1939); Locomobile Co. v. American Bridge Co., 80 App. Div. 44, 80 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1908). State courts disagree as to
what constitutes vexatious litigation. While this is primarily a matter of motive, it has
been held inferable from objective facts, such as the number of suits brought, lack of
any gain or benefit to the plaintiff from the suit and the distance of the forum from
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enjoined to prevent unnecessary and wasteful duplication, or because the
foreign suit will unduly prejudice the progress of the local action, or
because that suit may subvert the jurisdiction of the local court, or
because all relevant contacts are with the local state, leading to the
conclusion that the action can best be adjudicated there.40 Typical of
such holdings is Childress v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 41 where a North
Carolina court enjoined the defendant in an action before it from instituting a suit on the same collision in a Virginia court. The accident
had occurred in Virginia, but both the plaintiff and defendant were
from North Carolina. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in approving the issuance of the injunction, recited the general rule against
injunctions but went on to say that "an action or proceeding in another
state ordinarily may be enjoined where it is made to appear that its
prosecution will interfere unduly and inequitably with the progress
the place of residence of both parties. See O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 6 N.J. 170, 78
A.2d 64 (1951); Labak v. Graznar, 54 Ohio App. 191, 6 N.E.2d 790 (1935); cf. University
of Texas v. Morris, 162 Tex. 60, 344 S.V.2d 427, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 973 (1961). In
the O'Loughlin and Labak cases there was no action on the merits pending before the
court at the time of the issuance of the injunction. On the other hand, the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors in Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Pearson, 139 Conn. 186, 91
A.2d 778 (1952), where a party had brought several suits in different Connecticut courts
to block the taking of property under completed eminent domain proceedings, reviewed
an injunction issued on the grounds of vexatiousness and relitigation. The court
affirmed to prevent relitigation, but stated: "It is well settled that equity may enjoin
vexatious litigation. [Citing cases.] This power of equity exists independently of its
power to prevent a multiplicity of actions. It is based on the fact that it is inequitable
for a litigant to harass an opponent, not for the attainment of justice, but out of
malice. 28 Ams. JUR. 249, § 52. To be vexatious, litigation must be prosecuted not only
without probable cause but also with malice." Id. at 194, 91 A.2d at 781. The court
found no actual threats or vilification which would justify an inference of malice in the
facts of the case before it. Where there are a large number of concurrent suits an old
equity device called the "bill of peace" may be applicable. This remedy usually consists of consolidating all of the suits into one action, but also may involve injunctions to
ensure that the court of equity will be able to proceed without interference with the
rights of any of the parties. See Lyons v. Importers' & Traders' Nat'l Bank, 214 Pa. 428,
63 At. 827 (1906); IA MooRE, F i.tuL PAcricE 0.227, at 2626-27 (2d ed. 1961).
40 E.g., Doerr v. Warner, 247 Minn. 98, 76 N.W.2d 505 (1956); Applestein v. United
Board & Carton Corp., 35 N.J. 343, 173 A.2d 225 (1961); Barr v. Thompson, 350 S.W.2d
36 (rex. Civ. App. 1961). In Barr v. Thompson a Texas court temporarily enjoined the
prosecution of a stockholders' derivative suit in Delaware on the bill of the directors
and of certain partners in an affiliated firm. The Delaware suit was first in time, the
corporation had been formed under Delaware law, and the subsequent Texas proceeding sought only a declaratory judgment. Although such elements of convenience as
access to information, witnesses and availability of parties were in favor of the Texas
proceeding, the court did not rest on a forum non conveniens approach, noting that
this doctrine had never been recognized in Texas. Rather, the court stressed the interest
of equity in preventing multiple and inconclusive actions, emphasizing that all parties
and issues were before the Texas court, whereas all parties and issues were not before
the Delaware court. 350 S.W.2d at 42.
41 235 N.C. 522, 70 S.E.2d 558 (1952).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[VoL 32:471

of local litigation or with the establishment of rights properly justiciable
in the local court; or that it is unduly annoying, vexatious, and harassing
to the complainant, and reasonably calculated to subject him to oppres'42
sion or irreparable injury.
The Childress result may be justifiable in that it reduces the wasteful
litigation resulting from duplicative suits and prevents the possible ill
effects of a race to judgment in each suit. However, in view of such
alternative remedies available as the stay, compulsory counter-claim,
forum non conveniens, and consolidation, this result seems unwarrantedAnd although there are alternative remedies available in the relitigation,
fraud and public policy areas, there are also present in those cases
objective factors, not found in concurrency cases, to vitiate any presumption of good faith and a bona fide cause of action. While the
purpose of multiple and repetitive concurrent suits may be equally
to vex or harass, this is much more difficult to prove. Where a purely
vexatious motive cannot be conclusively shown, such multiplicity should
be tolerated, not only on grounds of comity but also because there are
often valid reasons for multiple actions. 43 On the other hand, where
the motive of vexatiousness can be clearly established, there is no reason
to impose a stricter standard in the concurrency area. In such cases,
it seems undesirable to force the equity plaintiff to incur unnecessary
expense and inconvenience, as well as a possible adverse result, and
44
an injunction should be an available remedy.

II.

THE

FEDERAL COURT PROHIBITION

A. Development and Interpretation
The Congress in 1793 made it clear how it felt about the power of
federal courts to enjoin proceedings before state courts: "[N]o . . . writ

of injunction [shall] be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a
state . .

.

.

-45 Two apparent primary motives for this statute were to

prevent unhampered intrusions by the new federal courts into the then
well-established state court domain and to codify the then prevailing
prejudices against any extension of equity jurisdiction and power.46
42 Id. at 531, 70 S.E.2d at 565.
43 See note 38 supra.
44 Cf. University of Texas v. Morris, 162 Tex. 60, 344 SAV.2d 427, cert. denied, 566

U.S. 973 (1961).
45 Act of March 2, 1793. Ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335, now embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1958).
46 Primary source material dealing with the Act of 1793 is scarce and inconclusive.
The most useful sources available are the reports of Attorney General Edmund Randolph to Congress on the proposed bill's changes in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Amt.
STATE PAPERS, 1 Misc. No. 17, at 21-36 (1834), and the biography of Oliver Ellsworth,
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While changes in American political structure and focus over the past
150 years have practically eliminated these narrow reasons for the prohibition, the need for independent federal and state court systems and
a fear of the dangerous friction generated by the free use of the in47
junction remain.
Despite the absolute language of the statute, however, federal courts
approved the use of the anti-suit injunction to bar the prosecution of
state court suits in a number of situations. 4s Beginning with French v.
-Hay49 in 1875, exceptions were judicially created to allow federal injunctions to bar state officials from enforcing unconstitutional statutes
or ordinances, 50 to prevent parties from relitigating in state courts controversies and issues previously adjudicated by a federal court, 51 to
prevent the enforcement of state court judgments obtained through
fraud, 52 and to keep state courts from acting in cases previously removed
53
to a federal court.
In 1941, however, in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 54 the Supreme

Court expressly struck down the "relitigation" exception, and advocated,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, a strict interpretation of the
then an important member of the Senate committee considering the bill. See BROWN,
LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 194 n.16, 209 (1905). Another possible explanation of the
statute, but one generally dismissed by commentators, is that the anti-injunction provisions were a reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which extended federal jurisdiction at the expense of the states and generated the eleventh
amendment. See generally Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 129-32
(1941) (Frankfurter, J.); Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169, 1170-72 (1933); Warren, Federal and State
Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REv. 345, 347-50 (1930).
47 See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1957); Toucey v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 129-30 (1941).
48 See generally Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State
Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 1145, 1149-69 (1932); Taylor &
Willis, supra note 46, at 1172-97; Warren, supra note 46, at 366-78; Note, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 726, 727-32 (1961); Comment, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 545, 546-53 (1947); Comment, 13
So. CAL. L. REv. 331, 332-39 (1940).
49 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250 (1875). Prior to this the courts had generally ignored the
statute, denying injunctions against state court proceedings on grounds of comity or
"necessity." See Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612 (1849). See generally Warren,
supra note 46, at 348, 359.
50 E.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
51 Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Julian v. Central Trust
Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904); cf. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
52 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S.
115 (1915); cf. Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891).
53 E.g., Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905);
Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494 (1881); French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250
(1875).
54 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
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statutory prohibition. The Court was motivated by a desire to give
effect to congressional pronouncements in the delicate matter of distributing judicial power between federal and state courts.
But Congress apparently no longer desired an absolute prohibition.
In 1948 the statute was changed significantly, and the Toucey holding
expressly rejected. Section 2283 now reads:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 55
This revision has not resolved the problems of interpretation, but rather
seems to have generated new confusion. The Reviser's Note to section
2283 indicates that the three phrases added to the general prohibition
were intended specifically to restore the "Act of Congress," "removal,"
and "relitigation" exceptions, but the Note goes on broadly to state
that "the revised section restores the basic law as generally understood
and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision." 56 Since there were preToucey exceptions that do not seem to come within the language of
the revised section, and since the law prior to Toucey was by no means
well-defined and consistently applied, the scope of the present federal
injunctive power is not nearly as clear as the revisers seem to have
57
expected.
The two primary interpretations advanced to explain section 2283
may be characterized as a strict and a flexible reading of the
statutory language. While both views recognize that the prohibition is
based on comity and that federal jurisdiction has not been wholly preempted,5s the positions differ in interpreting both the scope and bases
of the exceptions.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter was a leading spokesman for the strict interpretation. In Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co.,59
one of the most recent Supreme Court cases on section 2283, he stated:
"This is not a statute conveying a broad general policy for appropriate
ad hoc application. Legislative policy is here expressed in a clear-cut
55 June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958).
56 H.R. RE. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A181 (1948).
57 See generally Kochery, Conflict of Jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C. § 2283 and Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction,4 BUFFALO L. R v. 269 (1955); Comment, 35 CALrr. L. REv. 545,
562-63 (1947).
5s See, e.g., Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375, 378 (1939); Wells Fargo & Co.
v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175, 183 (1920); Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 593 (4th
Cir. 1964).
59 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
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prohibition qualified only by specifically defined exceptions." 60 The
exceptions envisaged by this view include only those specifically set
forth in the Reviser's Note-Act of Congress, removal, and relitigationand, as these have been applied by the federal courts, are based wholly
upon considerations of federal policy, divorced from any examination
into the equities of the particular case.61 Thus, the application of the
anti-suit injunction depends upon the factual situation falling into one
of these three areas, which themselves have been further narrowly
62
defined.
In part, the strict reading views section 2283 as an attempt to severely
limit and control the use of the anti-suit injunction by federal courts
in all future cases. 63 This view has been sharply criticized on an
historical, as well as a practical, level. 64 Moreover it seems just as reasonable to interpret the revision as intending to restore the judicial flexibility
existing before and endangered by the Toucey decision. 65 Certainly the
language of the three statutory exceptions is not overly restrictive, and
could well be read to allow injunctions in situations other than those
described in the Reviser's Note. Furthermore, it can be argued that since
judicial exceptions to the virtually absolute statutory language were
created on equitable as well as policy grounds prior to Toucey, this
same potential exists today, particularly since the revision apparently
intends to restore the whole law as it existed prior to Toucey.
A flexible reading of section 2283 is suggested by the Fourth Circuit
in the recent case of Baines v. City of Danville.66 Although the court
did not find express authorization in the Civil Rights Act of 1957 for
a federal injunction to bar the prosecution in state courts of Negro
demonstrators for violation of local ordinances and injunctions, and
thus refused to enjoin, the court did address itself to the general policy
of section 2283 and remanded the case for consideration of possible
60 Id. at 515-16.
61 See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (Act of Congress); Allied Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Roberson, 306 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1962) (relitigation).
62 See, e.g., Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc. v. Central Iron Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 791 (3d Cir.
1964); Loyd v. Stewart & Nuss, Inc., 327 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1964); Commerce Oil Ref.
Co. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1962). In a number of lower federal court cases a
general "twilight" doctrine has been formulated to deny the issuance of an injunction
in all borderline situations. See T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Williams, 275 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.
1960), and cases cited therein.
63 See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 514

(1955).
64 Id. at 522-23 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Kochery, supranote 57, at 275-86.
65 See 1A MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE 0.219, at 2601 (2d ed. 1961); 7 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcncE
60A0, at 648 (2d ed. 1955); Comment, 35 CONN. B.J. 378, 386 (1961).
66 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
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injunctions to bar future prosecutions under these ordinances. 67 In the
opinion by Judge Haynsworth, the court noted that since section 2283
had been "fathered by the principles of comity," it "should be read
in the light of those principles and, though absolute in its terms, is
inapplicable in extraordinary cases in which an injunction against state
court proceedings is the only means of avoiding grave and irreparable
68
injury."
This view would appear to be too "flexible." An unwarranted fourth
exception, one whose only bounds are the broad requirements of equity,
is engrafted onto a "clear legislative mandate." 69 While there may be
precedent for additional exceptions to those specifically enumerated,
arising where urgent policy considerations are found, such as where the
United States seeks the injunction, 70 the equity exception suggested in
Baines lacks the inherent limitations of the exception for the United
States and invites federal courts to ignore the prohibition at will. Thus,
the interaction of federal and state courts would be thrown upon virtually the same informal doctrines of comity that govern state court
relations. 71 This result cannot be justified where Congress, acting in
what it deems to be the national interest, has seen fit to impose a much
stricter standard.
On the other hand, equity cannot be dismissed in considering the
application and policies of section 2283. The basis and effectiveness of
the anti-suit injunction rests upon its adaptability and responsiveness
to the needs of each specific case. The automatic application suggested
under the "strict" interpretation creates a new policy which ignores
unconscionable harm or the availability and effectiveness of other
remedies, and which cannot be attributed to the purposes of section
2283. The fact that the revisers considered certain specific situations
does not mean that they ignored the foundations for these exceptions,
and certainly does not mean that these foundations were to be dis67 The court also found equitable bases for a temporary injunction in the denial of
bail, transference of trial by the state court to a location two hundred miles from the
defendants' homes, and its desire to preserve the justiciability of the case pending the
time for a full hearing. Id. at 593-94.
68 Id. at 593.
69 The court in Baines based its interpretation on Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157 (1943), which only implied that an injunction might be issued to bar
threatened state prosecutions based on an unconstitutional statute upon a "showing of
danger of irreparable injury, 'both great and immediate.'" 319 U.S. at 164. In no sense
can this case be said to create a general equity exception. See Note, 50 VA.L. REY. 1404,
1424-26 (1964).
70 See, e.g., Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
71 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1895); Jackson v. Shuttleworth, 42 Ill.
App. 2d 257, 258, 192 N.E.2d 217, 218 (1963); Labak v. Graznar, 54 Ohio App. 191, 194,
6 N.E.2d 790, 791-92 (1935). See also Note, 74 HARV. L. Rv. 726, 726-27 (1961).
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regarded within the specific areas. The statute should be read, therefore,
with a view to the equitable foundations of the desired federal injunction.
B. The Federal Court Prohibition and Traditional Grounds for AntiSuit Injunctions
Applying the equitable standards governing injunctions in the statestate area to federal-state cases, it will be seen that federal courts are
empowered to enjoin proceedings before state courts in many, if not
most, of the situations where state courts can do so, and often for the
same reasons.
1. Relitigation. In the "relitigation" area it is now clear that federal
courts may enjoin attempts to relitigate in state courts matters finally
adjudicated in the federal courts. 72 This is the import of the exception
in section 2283 allowing a federal court injunctive power "to protect
or effectuate its judgments" and of the Reviser's assertion that the
section specifically overrules the Toucey decision, which had eliminated
73
the judicially created relitigation exception.
Although the language of the section seems to be concerned primarily with upholding the adjudicative powers and dignity of the
federal courts, 7 4 the cases granting injunctions after the enactment of
section 2283 have also been concerned with the traditional equitable
factors justifying the injunction. Thus, in Jackson v. Carter Oil Co.,75
72 Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberson, 306 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1962); American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Taussig, 255 F.2d 765 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958);
Jacksonville Blow Pipe Co. v. RFC, 244 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1957) (alternative holding);
Berman v. Denver Tramway Corp., 197 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1952); Jackson v. Carter Oil
Co., 179 F.2d 524 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 812 (1950); NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1942).
73 H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A181 (1948). "The exceptions specifically
include the words 'to protect or effectuate its judgments,' for lack of which the Supreme
Court held that the Federal courts are without power to enjoin relitigation of cases
and controversies fully adjudicated by such courts. (See Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co...)."
74 In this connection, note the case of Berman v. Denver Tramway Corp., 197 F.2d
946 (10th Cir. 1952), where the court affirmed a district court injunction to bar the
prosecution of a state court action involving the nature of certain ordinances relating
to maximum rates for fares. The court of appeals had finally adjudicated this issue
twenty-five years previously in a suit involving a different plaintiff and cause of action.
The court stated: "A federal court is clothed with power to secure and preserve to
parties the fruits and advantages of its judgment or decree. In the appropriate exercise
of that power, the court has jurisdiction through means of a supplemental proceeding
to enjoin the relitigation in a state court of a matter litigated, determined, and adjudicated by its valid decree regularly entered, if the result of the relitigation would
be to destroy the effect of the decree rendered in the United States Court." 197 F.2d at
950.
75 179 F.2d 524 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 812 (1950).
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the Tenth Circuit upheld a federal court injunction barring a Seminole
Indian from relitigating, through the device of having a guardian appointed, the matter of his identity as an allottee of certain oil-bearing
lands. The same question had been decided against this plaintiff in
a number of previous cases, and the court, although speaking in terms
of protecting prior federal judgments, was clearly aware of the vexatious
nature of these numerous suits. 76
In deciding whether to issue an injunction under the relitigation exception in section 2283, the federal courts will often reach the same
results as would a state court in enjoining proceedings to prevent relitigation before another state court. But while the state court would
base its decision on strictly equitable grounds and thus, for example,
deny the injunction if an alternative remedy such as res judicata would
protect the rights of the equity plaintiff, the federal courts have enjoined automatically whenever there is a prior federal judgment. 77
This practice thwarts the principles of equity underlying the issuance
of any injunction, and may foster the unnecessary interference which
section 2283 is designed to prevent. In deference to the state courts,
if for no other reason, the federal courts should give greater weight to
equitable factors before exercising their injunctive powers.
2. Fraud or Collusion. Prior to the Toucey decision federal courts
could enjoin the enforcement of fraudulently obtained state court
judgments, 78 but could not enjoin the prosecution of pending state
court proceedings tainted by fraud or collusion.79 The rationale for
this distinction was that the enforcement of judgments did not come
within the term "proceedings" found in the statutory prohibition.8 0
76 In its statement of the case the court notes that "the matter has been in the courts
since 1932 and this is the third time it has been before this court.... In the numerous
actions, including this one, the appellant -maintained that he was the Raymond Jackson to whom the land was allotted and that he was being deprived of the lands and
the proceeds thereof by fraud and collusion. Each time these questions were presented
to the trial court there resulted a finding and final judgment that he was not the
allottee but was an imposter." 179 F.2d at 525.
77 Compare Oates v. Morningside College, 217 Iowa 1059, 252 N.W. 783 (1934) with
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Taussig, 255 F.2d 765 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 883 (1958).
78 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S.
115 (1915); cf. Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891).
79 Essanay Film Co. v. Kane, 258 U.S. 358 (1922); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tompa,
51 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1931).
80 In Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915), Mr. Justice Lamar, writing for the
Court, sustained a federal court injunction against the enforcement of an allegedly
fraudulent state court judgment, stating: "when the litigation has ended and a final
judgment has been obtained-and when the plaintiff endeavors to use such judgmenta new state of facts, not within the language of the statute may arise." Id. at 124. And
in Essanay Film Co. v. Kane, supra note 79, the Court drew this distinction even more
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The vitality of this exception is presently unclear. Neither section
2283 nor the Reviser's Note makes specific reference to it, although the
Note concludes with a sweeping assertion of full restoration of preToucey law. However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Toucey noted in a
dictum that since the exception was based on a distinction that was
no longer viable in light of the broad interpretation of "proceedings"
which had recently been set forth by the Court, "the foundation of
these cases is thus very doubtful."8' This implies that the exception
had expired before Toucey, and was not in a position to be restored.
Professor Moore, on the other hand, argues strenuously that this excep82
tion still exists and can be reconciled with the statute and cases.
Lower federal courts have divided on this issue, but without an authoritative holding.8 3
Even in Moore's analysis, however, the allowance of a federal injunction is limited to preventing the enforcement of fraudulent state
court judgments, and the old distinction thought to be necessitated
by the language of the statute is perpetuated. This distinction has been
defended on two grounds: (1) that injunctions to bar the enforcement
of judgments do not create the direct interference with the judicial
processes of a state court which the statute was designed to prevent;
and (2) that since judgments obtained through fraud are considered
void, they are open to attack in all courts regardless of the nature of
dearly in refusing to enjoin pending state court proceedings in which fraud was involved.
81 314 U.S. at 136. Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred to Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393,
403 (1935), where the Court stated that the term ".proceedings" in the statute encompassed "all steps taken or which may be taken in the state court or by its officers from
the institution to the close of the final process." The Court, however, specifically
recognized that fraudulent injunctions constituted an exception to this generalization.
296 U.S. at 403 &.n.19. Furthermore, the Hill case is clearly distinguishable on its facts.
The question before the Court-and one that was answered affirmatively-was only
whether an action in a state court brought by the state tax commissioner to determine
the fact and amount of any estate tax due, with a second action required for collection,
constituted judicial proceedings within the statute.
82 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
60.39[1], 60.59[2], at 644, 648 (2d ed. 1955).
83 Statements of the non-existence of this exception were made in Collins v. Laclede
Gas Co., 237 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1956) and Nongard v. Burlington County Bridge
Comm'n, 229 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1956). The contrary was implied in Greyhound Corp.
v. Leadman, 112 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Ky. 1953). Professor Moore distinguishes both the
Nongard and Laclede decisions on the grounds that these cases involved plaintiffs seeking to relitigate in a federal court issues previously adjudicated in state courts, and that
the refusal of the federal court to enjoin was therefore proper. But if the state court
judgment was really void due to fraud, there would seem to have been no prior valid
adjudication in the state court, and therefore the party cannot be said to be relitigating in the federal court. See IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.226, at 2622-26 (2d ed.
1961). See also Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 523
(1955) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 726, 728 (1961).
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the specific court.8 4 However, since the policy underlying the statute is
the prevention of unnecessary friction and ill feelings and the preservation of the independence of co-existent judicial systems, an injunction
which in any way attempts to restrict the actions and powers of a
state court engenders such friction, regardless of the stage of the state
suit. Moreover, federal courts have considered the effectuation of their
own judgments as part of their judicial proceedings, and have enjoined
state court proceedings which threatened to interfere and to thwart these
prior results.8 5
If an injunction is justified to prevent irreparable harm due to fraud
in the state suit, it should be allowed as to both pending and completed
state proceedings as is the case between state courts. But an injunction
against pending proceedings can only be reconciled with the language
of section 2283 if the federal court has prior jurisdiction over the controversy on the merits, since an ancillary injunction to bar fraudulent
state proceedings would then be "in aid of its jurisdiction." Since
federal courts otherwise possess full equity power8 6 and "original" federal
injunctions have been permitted to bar the enforcement of fraudulent
judgments, 87 the original-ancillary distinction required by the statute
seems artificial. Because fraud or collusion wholly vitiates any presumption of good faith or bona fide cause in the state suit and can
impose inequitable burdens in many cases, it seems that a clear statutory
exception is needed.
3. Public Policy. Federal injunctions against state court proceedings
are permitted by section 2283 when "expressly authorized by Act of
Congress."8 8 This area is perhaps not as much an example of true
"public policy" as it is of the supremacy of federal law, although the
particular congressional authorization is certainly an expression of
policy. The issuance of the injunction in this area has turned on a
determination of exactly what is meant by "expressly"-i.e., how
express must be the language in the particular Act of Congress. In
Richman the Supreme Court took the view that while the particular
statute need not refer explicitly to section 2283, it must show that
84 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236
U.S. 115 (1915). See also 1A MooRE, FEDERAL PRMrscE
0.226, at 2625 (2d ed. 1961);
Note, supra note 83, at 728.
85 See Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904); Central Nat'l Bank v. Stevens,
169 U.S. 432 (1898); Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867).
86 See Note, supra note 83, at 726-27.
87 E.g., Wells Fargo 8: Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236
U.S. 115 (1915).
88 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958). Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954) (National Labor Relations Act); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (Emergency
Price Control Act); Dilworth v. Riner, 342 F.2d - (5th Cir. 1965) (Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
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Congress clearly contemplated the use of the remedy."9 A more liberal
approach was suggested by the Fourth Circuit in Baines v. City of
Danville,90 which purported to follow Richman. There, the court denied
an injunction under the Civil Rights Act of 1957 because there was no
indication that the remedy was "antipathetic to statutory or judicially
recognized limitations upon its exercise." The court indicated, thus,
that the necessary statutory authorization may be "implicit," but only
if the statutes "were, at the least, thoroughly incompatible with a literal
application of the anti-injunction statute"1--where the necessity to bar
state court proceedings was a necessary corollary to the power and pro92
visions of the particular federal statute.
Federal injunctions restraining subsequent state court proceedings
93
on a cause of action removed to a federal court have long been upheld.
This exception was judicially created, but was incorporated by Congress
in section 2283, which permits the federal court to enjoin "where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." 94 By not including removal in
the general "Act of Congress" exception, Congress indicated that the
language of the Removal Acts was not sufficiently "express," 95 an implication that would seem contrary to the interpretation of the Baines
court. 90
89 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 516-18 (1955).
90 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
91 Id. at 589. See Note, 50 VA. L. RFv. 1404 (1964).
92 The result of these cases is again a relatively flexible interpretation of the actual
language of § 2283. If such liberty is to be condoned, it can only be justified where
equity otherwise requires the injunctive remedy. The dissent in the Baines case found
congressional authorization for an injunction in the 1957 Civil Rights Act and emphasized the underlying equitable and policy considerations, noting "that First Amendment rights of the entire Negro community would . . .be irreparably injured" if the
state prosecutions were allowed to proceed. "Comity does not require the federal courts
to sit idly by when only an equitable remedy can effectively protect these rights . ..
It is the duty of the federal courts to protect these rights, and the statute, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983, expressly authorizes equitable relief. ... Since it is obvious that in the context
of this case no other civil remedy could possibly accomplish the Congressional purpose
to afford the Negro citizen equal rights, there is every reason to hold that the equitable
remedy expressly authorized in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 is within the exception set forth in
28 U.S.C.A. § 2283." 337 F.2d at 601. See also Dilworth v. Riner, 342 F.2d - (5th Cir.
1965), where the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was found to provide the requisite authorization to enjoin state court proceedings and Baines was distinguished.
93 Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905);
Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494 (1881).
94 See Reviser's Note, H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A181 (1948).
95 The removal provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1958), state only that "the state court
shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded." This is certainly "incompatible" with any further state court proceedings, but does not refer to the use
of an injunction.
96 In Baines the court referred expressly to the Removal Acts as an example of implied injunctive power in a federal statute. 337 F.2d at 589. See notes 92, 95 supra.
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When the United States seeks the injunction in its sovereign capacity,
"to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a national interest," 97 the
Supreme Court in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States9s held that
section 2283 did not apply. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the Court, stated
that "the frustration of superior federal interests that would ensue from
precluding the Federal Government from obtaining a stay of state
court proceedings except under the severe restrictions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 would be so great that we cannot reasonably impute such a
purpose to Congress from the general language of 28 U.S.C. § 2283
alone."09
Another pre-Toucey exception to the federal prohibition which was
not specifically mentioned in section 2283 or in the Reviser's Note apparently existed when state courts or officials attempted to enforce unconstitutional statutes or ordinances. In the leading case of Ex parte
YoungOO a state official was enjoined from bringing an action to
enforce a statute setting extremely low intra-state railroad rates and
imposing severe penalties for violations. The Court did not refer to
the federal injunction prohibition but alluded instead to the general
exemption of criminal proceedings from equity jurisdiction. The Court
found an exception to this exemption where the court of equity had
jurisdiction prior to the institution of the criminal prosecution and thus
affirmed the injunction. But in a dictum Mr. Justice Peckham also
noted that the federal court could not interfere by injunction with
proceedings already pending in the state court.1 01
The implications of this dictum have led to a distinction between
pending and completed state suits similar to that which evolved in the
area of fraud.102 Thus, it has been thought that the federal prohibition
97 Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1957).
98 352 U.S. 220 (1957). Other cases include United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1963); United States v. Inaba, 291 Fed. 416 (E.D.
Wash. 1923). But where the United States is not acting in its sovereign capacity but
merely is a private party the prohibition of § 2283 will apply. United States v. Bank
of N.Y. & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 563 (1936); Eden Memorial Park Ass'n v. United States,
300 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1962).
99 Id. at 226. Again, -the proclivity of the federal courts to develop exceptions to the
language of the statute is revealed, this time primarily on the basis of policy. These
developments, however, seem inevitable with a statute which rests upon comity and
which dearly recognizes certain exceptions even within its own language. In Leiter
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, usually one of the strongest proponents of a strict interpretation and firm inter-court controls, performed the service. Compare with Leiter his
statement in Richman: "By that enactment, Congress made dear beyond cavil that the
prohibition is not to be whittled away by judicial improvisation." 348 U.S. at 514.
100 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
101 Id. at 162.
102 See Note, supra note 83, at 728-29.
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did not apply where state court proceedings to enforce an unconstitutional statute were not actually pending, but only threatened, since the
direct interference contemplated by the statute did not result. Nevertheless, the artificiality of this distinction seems as apparent here as
in the fraud area. 10 3 An injunction would seem to be a possible remedy
if necessary to prevent irreparable harm in the case of both pending
and threatened state proceedings. 104 Authorization for this remedy
is not found in section 2283, and would have to be based on a finding
of the superior interest in upholding the Constitution-taking the
position either that Congress could not have intended in any way to
subordinate this goal, and thus did not contemplate a situation such
as Young, or that Congress in any case does not have the power, even if it
so intended, to thwart the Constitution. Since many of the injunctions
in this area are sought by the United States, under Leiter Minerals
section 2283 is inapplicable in either case.' 0 5
Most of the recent litigation involving "public policy" considerations
has arisen where exclusive federal jurisdiction is alleged by a party
to the state court proceeding. 106 In the leading case of Amalgamated
103 See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra; Comment, 35 CALIF. L. Rxv. 545, 552
(1947). The Comment states that since the original basis of the distinction was one
arising out of in rem proceedings, where the court first taking jurisdiction of the res
could prevent any subsequent interference by other courts, and since this rule is no
longer applicable to proceedings in personam, the distinction should be re-examined.
"It is at odds with the general requirement of immediately threatened irreparable
injury. The actual pendency ofl state enforcement suits is the best evidence of threatened
injury, and the interference with the state government is virtually the same whether
injunctions are issued before or after state judicial action has commenced. Unless section 265 [predecessor to § 2283] is interpreted as not to bar the institution of any suits,
the constitutional exception should be made general or dropped altogether."
104 In Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), the Supreme Court refused
to allow a federal injunction to bar the prosecution of threatened criminal proceedings
in a state court under a statute that had previously been held unconstitutional. The
Court stated that the grounds for equity intervention into criminal .proceedings must
be "only on a showing of danger or irreparable injury, 'both great and immediate.'"
Id. at 164. This formula was applied to allow an injunction against a pending criminal
prosecution under a local labor ordinance in Denton v. City of Carrollton, 235 F.2d
481, 484 (5th Cir. 1956).
105 See cases cited note 98 supra, Such a case is United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772
(5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962). There a federal court injunction was
allowed to bar the prosecution of a breach of the peace action against a Negro who
had been assisting in the registration of voters in Mississippi. One ground for the injunction was the fact that the suit had been brought by the United States to protect
federal interests (the right to register to vote). An alternative ground was that the Civil
Rights Act of 1957 was intended to cover such situations and that an injunction was
one of the remedies it provided. Thus, the "Act of Congress" exception was invoked. See
Recent Developments, 62 CoLvAr. L. REv. 901 (1962). But see, as to the latter point,
Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
106 See Kochery, Conflict of Jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C. § 2283 and Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction.4 BUFFALO L. REv. 269 (1955); Note, 48 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 383 (1953).
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the Supreme Court affirmed

a federal court's denial of a union request to enjoin an employer's
state court suit which sought to enjoin union picketing and other
activity. The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held
that such an injunction did not fall within any of the exceptions in
section 2283. The Taft-Hartley Act was held to allow injunctions
generally, but only on application by the National Labor Relations
108
Board, and thus no "express" congressional authorization was found.
Secondly, since the Board had primary jurisdiction over labor disputes,
the Court ruled that the Board must first invoke the jurisdiction of
the district court before that court could enjoin "in aid of its jurisdiction."'109 Most important for the purposes of this discussion, the
Court rejected the union's third contention for an injunction, namely
"that section 2283 does not apply whenever the moving party in the
District Court alleges that the state court is 'wholly without jurisdiction
over the subject matter, having invaded a field pre-empted by Congress.'-110 The Court based its conclusion on its reading of section
2283 as codifying existing law and precluding the courts from developing
further exceptions. Even granting that Congress may have intended to
restore all pre-Toucey law, the Court found no established exception
for "exclusive jurisdiction."'
Although it is often quite difficult to ascertain what exactly is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts and agencies, in cases
where such jurisdiction is found a federal injunction against state court
proceedings should be granted. 112 The usurpation of authority by state
107

348 U.S. 511 (1955).

108 Id. at 516.
109 Id. at 519-20. (Emphasis added.) Compare Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.

Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955) with Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
501 (1954). In Capital Service the union first filed with the National Labor Relations
Board to bar the employer's suit in a state court to enjoin union picketing. The Board
then brought the action in a federal court for an injunction, which was granted and
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
110 348 U.S. at 515. The Court made the assumption that the subject matter was
one wholly outside the control or jurisdiction of the state court, and decided the
case on this assumption. Id. at 514.
111 348 U.S. at 514. But see Warren, C.J., dissenting, id. at 521-23; Kochery, supra
note 106.
112 See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955). Professor Moore
suggests that where a state court has prior jurisdiction in an action on a contract, for
example, to which violation of the anti-trust laws, a matter of exclusive federal
jurisdiction, is pleaded as a defense, there should be no federal injunction. See
Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 201 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 923
(1953); Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers, Inc., 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952);
Avon Publishing Co. v. American News Co., 143 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). On the
other hand, where state courts are dealing with matters wholly delegated by Congress
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courts in these cases is certainly injurious to national interests, and can
often result in unconscionable harm to the individual party. In cases
where exclusive federal jurisdiction is found such harm should be
presumed and the issuance of the injunction should not depend on its
proof.1 3

The injunction may be justified on one of two grounds. First, it
would seem to be "necessary in aid of [the federal court's] jurisdiction."
However, Richman implies that such jurisdiction would have to be
invoked by the body possessing exclusive jurisdiction, 114 and possibly
would bE further restricted to cases where the injunction sought was
ancillary to a pending hearing on the merits of the case."1 5 For these
reasons the second is the better ground-that section 2283 was never
intended to apply in cases of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Support for
this conclusion may be found by drawing an analogy to the situation
where injunctions are sought by the United States to protect "national
interests." 116 The supremacy of federal law also supports this position.
4. Multiplicity of Actions and Concurrency. As in the state-state
cases, a federal court should be extremely reluctant to enjoin proceedings
before a state court merely because a suit on the same cause is also
being heard in the federal court. Although the injunction could be
justified as arguably "in aid of [the federal court's] jurisdiction," 117
its issuance would virtually emasculate section 2283. Such action would
also foster direct interference with pending state judicial proceedings,
either to federal courts or agencies, no benefit and much potential harm will result
from allowing the parties to proceed in the state court or to enforce a state court
judgment. See FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962); Bland
Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1949). See generally IA MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACricE
0.208[4], at 2324-25 (2d ed. 1961).
113 As in the case of injunctions sought by the United States, an injunction to
protect the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts is primarily a matter of
policy and should not necessarily be linked to equity. The chief harm here is to
national interests and power, and the equities of the particular case are secondary.
In practically every case harm to the defendant in the wrongful state court suit
would seem to be presumable and all but impossible to counter.
114 348 U.S. at 519-21. See note 109 supra.
115 See Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954); Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503 (1944). See also text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
116 This is the conclusion reached by Kochery, supra note 106, after an excellent
and thorough analysis of the Richman case and § 2283.
117 The injunction might be in aid of the jurisdiction of the federal court where
it had taken jurisdiction over the whole controversy and an ancillary injunction
was needed to prevent external interference in other courts and to preserve the
justiciability of the cases. See American Ins. Co. v. Lester, 214 F.2d 578 (4th Cir.
1954) (dictum). But see Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, 49 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1931)
(alternative holding); Leshem v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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which all courts have recognized as forbidden and which led to the
"pending-completed" state action distinction," 8 without the policy
goals present in the removal and exclusive jurisdiction areas and without
the clear evidence of inequitable and vexatious motivation present in
the relitigation area. 119 Again, as in the state-state relationship, the
difficulty with concurrency lies in the problem of proving a vexatious
motive in bringing multiple actions, since there are often valid reasons
for multiplicity.2 0 Thus, in Kline v. Burke Ccanstr. Co.,1 2 1 the Supreme
Court held that a federal court could not enjoin a concurrent action
involving the same issues brought by the defendant in the federal suit
for purposes of protecting its own prior jurisdiction, stating:
Each court is free to proceed in its own way and in its own
time, without reference to the proceedings in the other court.
Whenever a judgment is rendered in one of the courts and
pleaded in the other, the effect of that judgment is to be
determined by the application of res adjudicata by the court
in which the action is still pending .... 122
Some tolerance of duplicative and wasteful litigation would seem
to be the necessary price for maintaining harmonious federal and state
court relations. Even when the state court suit can clearly be shown
to be vexatious, a federal injunction is difficult to reconcile with the
statute, absent a general equity exception. Such an exception, as has
been noted, would be uncontrollable, and render the statute meaningless. 2 3 Instead, the evils of multiplicity between federal and state
See text accompanying notes 79-80, 84, 102 supra.
119 Injunctions under the removal or relitigation exceptions would seem to be in
furtherance of federal policy in that they are expressly permitted under § 2283. An
injunction to prevent relitigation can be further justified on equitable grounds,
insofar as absence of a bona fide cause of action and good faith may be inferred from
the attempted evasion of a prior final judgment. Similar analysis could be applied
to injunctions in removal situations-that an attempt to continue in a state court
is evidence of bad faith. It is unfortunate, however, that Congress did not include
the removal exception under the "Act of Congress" rather than under the "in aid
of its jurisdiction" phrase in § 2283. Continued proceedings in a state court are
incompatible with removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1958). See text accompanying notes
91-92 supra. The use of a general "jurisdiction" phrase leads to difficulties in the
multiplicity area, where injunctions may also be ancillary, and creates problems
relating to the apparently greater rights of a defendant in a federal court on removal
over a plaintiff in an original federal suit, since the latter generally cannot obtain
an anti-suit injunction. See generally Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S.
118, 133 (1941); Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings
in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169, 1172-75 (1933).
120 See Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IowA L. REv. 11, 24 (1961); Note, 60
COLUM. L. Ry. 684, 698-709 (1960).
121 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
118

122

Id. at 230.

123 See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
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courts should be combatted by the alternative devices of abatement or
stay by the second court, consolidation and the compulsory counterclaim, and the doctrines of forum non conveniens and judicial ab124
stention.

III.

THE STATE COURT PROHIBITION

A. Development and Interpretation
The prohibition on state court injunctions to bar federal proceedings
is the product of judicial decisions, both state and federal, and undoubtedly arises out of the same considerations of comity and independence which motivated the federal statutory prohibition. 125 Indeed,
the early development of both prohibitions was frequently in terms
of mutuality and reciprocity, 126 with great weight being given to an
12 7
1836 statement of the rule by Mr. Justice Story.
The state ban was first set forth in the 1812 Supreme Court case of
McKim v. Voorhies.12 8 There, a victorious plaintiff in an ejectment suit
before a federal court was denied a writ of habere facias possessionem
by the clerk of that court, the clerk having been enjoined from issuing
the writ by a state court on the defendants' bill. The Court held that
the writ of habere facias must issue, and added, by way of a strong
dictum, that "the State Court had no jurisdiction to enjoin a judgment
of the Circuit Court of the United States."' 29 Later, in Riggs v. Johnson
County, 130 the Court similarly invalidated a state court injunction as
an encroachment on a prior federal court judgment. The federal
124 See Vestal, supranote 120, at 18-28.
125 See generally Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 814 U.S. 118, 129-32 (1941)
(Frankfurter, J.); Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV.
345 (1930).
126 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 135 (1941); Kline v. Burke
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922); Amy v. The Supervisors, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 136
(1870); Prugh v. Portsmouth Say. Bank, 48 Neb. 414, 67 N.V. 309 (1896); Keith v.
Alger, 114 Tenn. 1, 85 S.W. 71 (1905). See generally Warren, supra note 125, at 359-68;
Note, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 714 (1942).
127 2 STORY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE 186 (Ist ed. 1836): "And it is now held, that whereever the parties are resident within a country, the Courts of that country have
full authority to act upon them personally with respect to the subject of suits in a
foreign country, as the end of justice may require . . . . There is a recognized
exception to this doctrine in America; and that is, that the State Courts cannot
injoin proceedings in the Courts of the United States; nor the latter in the former.
But this exception proceeds upon peculiar grounds of municipal and constitutional
law, the respective courts being entirely competent to administer full relief in the
suits pending therein." For a general discussion of this "dogma," its basis, and subsequent broad influence, see Note, State Injunctions Against Proceedings in the
Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 714 (1942).
128 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 278 (1812).
129 Id. at 280.
130 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867).
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court had issued a mandamus to require a county official to levy a tax
to support a bond issue. After the issuance of the bonds, the state
decided that the authorizing statute was illegal, and the state court,
in a taxpayer's suit, enjoined the official from levying the tax. The
Court, in striking down the injunction, stated:
State courts are exempt from all interference by the Federal
tribunals, but they are destitute of all power to restrain either
the process or proceedings in the national courts. Circuit courts
and State courts act separably and independently of each other,
and in their respective spheres of action the process issued by
the one is as far beyond the reach of the other, as if the line of
division between them "was traced by landmarks and monu31
ments visible to the eye."'
Similarly, in Central Nat'l Bank v. Stevens, 132 the Court again held
that a state court could not enjoin the execution of a federal court
judgment. The Court relied on Riggs among other cases and declared
that the state court injunction "was a plain interference with the proceedings in another court .... .133
Even while judicial exceptions were being carved into the
absolute language of the federal statute, the state courts were still
1 34
deemed incapable of enjoining proceedings before a federal court.
And yet cases such as McKim, Riggs and Stevens, which are cited for
this conclusion, do not support this broad prohibition. Except in the
case of fraud, federal courts have been equally unable to enjoin the
135
execution of state court judgments.
131 Id. at 195-96.

169 U.S. 432 (1898).
Id. at 459.
134 Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts: The
Life History of a Statute, 30 MicH. L. REV. 1145, 1149 (1932), in particular, advances
the thesis that the period of nationalism and industrial growth following the Civil
War generated political forces that led to the expansion of federal court powers in
all areas. Similar reasoning would seem to explain the fact that corresponding
exceptions were not developed at this time to the state court prohibition. Very few
attempts were made to enjoin by state courts, probably because the state courts were
just as cognizant of the prevailing political and industrial forces as the federal
courts, and the situations in which exceptions might have been developed simply
did not arise.
135 See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872); Randall v. Howard, 67 U.S.
(2 Black) 585 (1862); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860); Mills v.
Provident Life g: Trust Co., 100 Fed. 344 (9th Cir. 1900). It has been suggested that
in light of the more direct interference thought to be engendered by injunctions
against pending court proceedings, these judgment cases-Riggs and Stevens-could
embody an absolute prohibition, and that Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S.
408 (1964), was a natural conclusion from a reading of these cases. See Arnold, State
Power to Enjoin Federal Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REv. 59, 69 (1965). However, this
132
133
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Despite the broad language setting forth the state ban, 136 state
court injunctions against the prosecution of federal suits have been
upheld in a number of state cases. In many the ban on state injunctions was simply ignored, 137 while in others the authority of cases
8
like Riggs and Stevens was evaded or distinguished.13 Indeed, in
139
the recent case of University of Texas v. Morris, the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed the issuance of an injunction barring the further prosecution of a suit in a federal court in New Mexico. The court did not
mention the state ban and based its decision solely on the equitable
grounds for such an injunction.
Thus, historically, the conclusion is far from inescapable that state
courts are absolutely without power to enjoin the prosecution of
federal court actions. Both courts and commentators have suggested
that this power does in fact exist, concluding that it has not been
argument appears to overlook several items: first, the reciprocal standing of the
federal and state bans and the exceptions in the federal ban which have long
been recognized and are now granted congressional sanction; second, although an
injunction against the enforcement of a judgment may engender less interference
and even be beyond the statutory prohibition, in the absence of a clear showing of
irreparable harm due to equitable or constitutional grounds, federal courts have
not enjoined the enforcement of state court judgments. These grounds have been
found only where the state court judgment had been obtained through fraud,
a situation that did not exist here. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S.
175 (1920). Therefore, there is no showing that the Court in either Riggs or
Stevens envisaged an absolute ban on state injunctions.
136 In Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 196 (1867), the Court
stated: "Viewed in any light, therefore, it is obvious that the injunction of a State
court is inoperative to control, or in any manner affect the process or proceedings
of a Circuit court .... "
137 Karcher v. Burbank, 303 Mass. 303, 21 N.E.2d 542 (1939); Chambers v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 236 Mo. App. 823, 157 S.V.2d 593 (1942); University of Texas
v. Morris, 162 Tex. 60, 344 S.V.2d 427, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 973 (1961).
138 In Shaw v. Frey, 69 N.J. Eq. 321, 59 Atl. 811 (Ch. 1905), the vice chancellor,
with specific reference to the Riggs and Stevens cases, stated that "the doctrine that
a state court may never restrain a litigant in a federal court, cannot, in my opinion,
be supported by the adjudications of the supreme court of the United States. ...
I have been unable to find any adjudication that establishes so broad a principle."
Id. at 324, 59 At. at 812. Following this decision, and attempting to reconcile it
with Riggs and Stevens, later New Jersey cases have drawn a distinction between
enjoining pending federal court proceedings (valid under Shaw) and enjoining the
execution of federal court judgments (forbidden by Riggs and Stevens). See Fort v.
The Lang Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 527, 180 Ad. 395 (Ch. 1935); Smith v. Reed, 74 N.J. Eq.
776, 70 Atl. 961 (Ch. 1908). This result is the opposite of what logic would suggest in
light of the general principles of non-interference, but its significance would seem to
lie both in the importance with which state courts regard their injunctive powers and
the refusal to accept either Riggs or Stevens as controlling authority for any absolute
state court prohibition.
139 162 Tex. 60, 344 S.V.2d 427, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 973 (1961).
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140

exercised primarily out of considerations of comity.
In view of the
now established exceptions to the federal statutory prohibition, it
seems reasonable to conclude that a similar relaxation of the state
prohibition is in order for reasons of reciprocity and the prevention of
141
inequities.
However, in its recent decision in Donovan v. City of Dallas,142 the
Supreme Court in effect rejected this argument and, at the same time,
re-affirmed the state court prohibition in broad terms. In this case, a
class suit was brought in a Texas court to enjoin the construction of
improvements to a municipal airport and to bar the issuance of
municipal bonds to finance these improvements. Summary judgment
was entered for the city, affirmed on appeal and review denied by the
Supreme Court of Texas. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Thereafter a suit based on the same allegations and with the same objectives
was instituted in a federal district court. In an action by the city to
enjoin the prosecution of this suit, the Supreme Court of Texas held
that the injunction should issue, basing its decision wholly on the
equitable grounds associated with relitigation, without reference to the
state ban.

1 43

The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black, reversed,
holding that the Texas court was without injunctive power to affect
proceedings in the federal court. The opinion was based on two grounds:
first, that "while Congress has seen fit to authorize courts of the United
States to restrain state-court proceedings in some special circumstances,
it has in no way relaxed the old and well-established judicially declared
rule that state courts are completely without power to restrain federal
court proceedings in in personam actions like the one here"' 44; and
second, that the plaintiffs had a right to be in a federal court-"a right
which is theirs by reason of congressional enactments passed pursuant to
140 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 56 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Bryant v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 92 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1937) (L.
Hand, J.); MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE
0.03[49], at 416-17 (1949);
Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention
Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 491 (1960).
141 Of the exceptions expressly noted in the Reviser's Note to § 2283, only that
for relitigation is applicable to the situation of 'state court injunctions. The Act of
Congress and removal ekceptions are, of course, peculiar to the federal courts.
142 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
143 In City of Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919 (rex. Sup. Ct. 1963), the Texas
Supreme Court stated "we hold . . . that exercise of such jurisdiction is mandatory
when an actual interference with enforcement of the judgment is coupled with the
second suit or when the mere prosecution of the suit destroys the efficacy of the
judgment." 365 S.W.2d at 925.
144 377 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964).
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499

congressional policy"' 45 -and that this "right was granted by Congress
46
and cannot be taken away by the state."'
The first of these grounds is certainly questionable. By implying that
Congress, in relaxing only the federal court prohibition, intended the
state prohibition to remain absolute, the Court ignores the fact that
Congress has never addressed itself, one way or the other, to the state
ban, even assuming that it has power over the state courts in this regard
through indirect means. 147 Indeed, since the federal bar was traditionally
couched in terms of reciprocity, the fact that that ban was relaxed should
argue for a similar relaxation of the state prohibition. Furthermore, the
cases relied on by Mr. Justice Black for this "well-established rule"McKim, Riggs and Stevens-do not support as broad a statement as he
made 148 and were readily disposed of in Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting
149
opinion.
The Court's second ground requires closer scrutiny. The proposition
advanced is that parties properly before a federal court have a right to
be there, a right granted by Congress which cannot be thwarted by state
action. This is not a matter of the superiority of federal courts, but of
the supremacy of federal law.150 If Congress intended to and did grant
such an absolute right to a federal trial, then under the supremacy clause
state law cannot defeat it.
The assertion of an "indefeasible right to a federal trial" has been
raised most often in connection with the power of a federal court to
stay or dismiss proceedings before it in favor of prior, concurrent state
court proceedings involving the same issues and parties.' 15 The alleged
145 Id.

at 412.

146 Id. at 413.
147 Conceivably, Congress could declare that an area of federal court jurisdiction
is or is not amenable to state court injunctions, and thus indirectly affect state
court power. However, it has never done so explicitly, and certainly not at all on
the scale that the Donovan Court contemplated.
148 See text accompanying notes 128-35 supra.
149 377 U.S. at 418-20. However, Mr. Justice Harlan does not address himself
directly to the state ban, and sees Donovan as simply involving duplicative and
vexatious litigation for which an injunction is an appropriate remedy between state
courtS.
150 The issue of federal court superiority is a recurrent one, raised most often in
connection with removal and the greater federal habeas corpus power. It was dismissed as a general rule in areas of concurrent federal and state court jurisdiction
in Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234-35 (1922): "it was . . . equally the
duty of the state court to take the case and proceed to judgment. There can be no
question of judicial supremacy, or of superiority of individual right." See also Arnold,
supra note 135, at 71.
11 Milk Drivers Union v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 304 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.
1962); P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951); Mottolese v.
Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949). Contra, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania
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"right," however, has been wholly the product of dicta and does not rest
on any firm congressional mandate. 152 Certainly, exceptions have been
recognized by federal courts through abstention, 153 stays' 54 and forum
non conveniens. 155
However, it is one thing for a federal court to be able to stay or dismiss
and entirely another for a state court to possess this control indirectly
through its injunctive power. At stake here, it is felt, is the very independence of the federal courts-the purposes of diversity jurisdiction
R.R., 322 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1963); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th
Cir. 1963). See generally Note, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 684 (1960); Note, 59 YALE L.J. 978
(1950). A distinction can perhaps be drawn where the federal court has not stayed its
proceeding in deference to the prior state court action, but has dismissed. In the
latter situation, the federal court action has been held improper. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra.
152 See generally Note, 59 YALE L.J. 978, 980 (1950). Apparently the first statement
of this "right" was in a dictum by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall. Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 403 (1821). The strongest statement after this occurred in McClellan
v. Garland, 217 U.S. 268, 283 (1910). Again only dictum was involved, to the effect
that a federal court could not stay proceedings before it when they were prior in
time to the state court proceedings. See also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226,
234-35 (1922); Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893).
153 The doctrine of equitable abstention has frequently been before the Supreme
Court in recent years. It involves allowing a federal court to stay or even dismiss
actions before it which turn on unsettled questions of state law, in order to permit
the state courts to rule on these questions. Most of the cases have dealt with the
interpretation of allegedly unconstitutional state statutes or local ordinances. England
v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), is the most recent case in this
field. See generally Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: .The Federal
Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1960); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TExAS L. REv. 815 (1959); Note, 59 COLuM. L. Rav. 749 (1959); Note, 108
U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1959).
154 Where admiralty jurisdiction was involved and the state court had prior jurisdiction in a suit against an owner, it was held that the federal court should have
stayed its action. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931). And where the federal court
action was for a declaratory judgment, the Supreme Court has held that the action
should be dismissed where the issues were capable of resolution in a prior pending
state court action. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942). There
are indications of the attitude of at least one present member of the Court on this
practice. In England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 430 & n.2 (1964),
a case involving a ramification of the abstention doctrine, Mr. Justice Douglas, in a
concurring opinion urging a full review of the doctrine, referred in a footnote to
the fact that "some federal courts have used the doctrine to shuttle over to state
courts cases properly in the federal court yet not involving constitutional issues
dependent on the meaning of state law (see Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301
[2d Cir. 1949]; Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 [2d Cir. 1951])-decisions
which baldly deny a suitor the remedy granted by Congress because it is not convenient to the district judge to decide the case."
'55 Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955); Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947). Presently, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1958) recognizes this transfer to another federal
court, maintaining federal jurisdiction.
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in particular may be abrogated. 156 However, state injunctions are recognized as valid in some areas, especially in cases involving in rem
jurisdiction 157 and perhaps in FELA actions.158 As has been noted,
Congress has not dealt with state injunctive power and has not granted
immunity from state injunctions to all federal litigants. 1 9 In section 2283
it has recognized the necessity of limited federal interference with state
court proceedings. Where Congress by means of exclusive federal jurisdiction or other direction has not segregated important national interests, 1 0 notions of mutuality and reciprocity would seem to require
that if a federal court can enjoin the prosecution of proceedings before a
state court, the state court should be similarly empowered. 161
Thus, the double standard espoused in Donovan should not be maintained. It has no basis in history or logic, and its effect will be to favor
certain litigants at the expense of others. Moreover, the double standard
will inevitably result in a diminution of the dignity and power of the
state courts, since they, unlike the federal courts, will be unable to protect
their judgments or jurisdiction in many cases. The equality and mutual
respect upon which the two systems of courts are founded must be
adversely affected. 162 It would seem, then, that the state court prohibi156 See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1942) (Stone,
C.J., dissenting). See also State v. Frost, 113 Wis. 623, 652, 89 N.W. 915, 922 (1902):
"It cannot be doubted that the jurisdiction of the federal court depends wholly upon
the constitution and laws of the United States ....
"
157 E.g., Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
158 See Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 294 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1961), where
a federal court in an FELA action was held bound on the basis of comity to give
effect to a state court anti-suit injunction. The validity of this case after Donovan,
however, is certainly doubtful.
109 See text accompanying note 147 supra.
160 One argument that can be advanced here is that the federal courts provide a
"haven" in some areas. Civil rights affords a prominent example today and was
explicitly raised by the Donovan petitioners as an example of the "horribles" that
might flow from permitting any state court injunctive power. Brief for Petitioners,
p. 23, Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964). However, while this argument
may have merit in particular cases, the sweeping generalization advanced in Donovan
is unwarranted. Specific areas which require such protection should be delineated
by Congress. It is arguable that Congress has so acted where it has granted exclusive
jurisdiction to federal courts and agencies. Even if these acts do not specifically grant
injunctive power to the federal courts, it is altogether another thing to say that
state courts can enjoin in these fields. Cf. United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 773 (5th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962). To hold state courts without power to
enjoin parties to federal proceedings is different from holding them without power
in cases such as Donovan, where state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction and have
a clear right to proceed. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
161 See generally HART & WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
38-40 (1953).
162 Perhaps the most authoritative discussion of the equality of the federal and
state courts in areas of concurrent jurisdiction is that by Hamilton in The Federalist
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tion, like the federal court prohibition, should not be considered as an
absolute but, instead, as an expression of strict comity to be weighed
against the demands of equity in the individual case.
B. The State Court Prohibitionand Traditional Grounds for Anti-Suit
Injunctions
Applying the traditional equity bases underlying anti-suit injunctions
to the state court prohibition, it seems that state power to enjoin the
prosecution of federal court proceedings generally should exist where the
converse power exists in the federal courts.
1. Relitigation. In the relitigation area, in particular, state injunctive
power seems desirable. Those considerations of equity and the need to
protect the court's dignity and judgments which appear in the state-state
and federal-state areas are equally important here.163 However, the
Donovan case specifically struck down the state's power to issue such an
injunction, although it affords one of the clearest examples of a situation
where such power is desirable and necessary. 164 The plaintiffs had had
their day in court, and the controversy was finally adjudicated by a
dearly competent tribunal. To permit these plaintiffs to re-open this
case in a federal court would be to countenance not only an attempt to
evade the prior state court judgment, and impose needless expenses and
hardship upon the already victorious city, but would also effectively
delay any construction on the municipal improvements, leading to a
clear inference of a purpose to vex and harass. 165 The equitable conNo. 82. In defense of the proposed concurrency, he wrote that the "national and state
systems are to be regarded as ONE WHOLE. The courts of the latter will of course be
natural auxiliaries to execution of the laws of the union . . . . I hold that the
state courts will be divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction . . . that in
every case in which they were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the
national legislature, they will of course take cognizance of the causes to which those
acts may give birth." THE FDE.ALisT No. 82, at 555-56 (Cooke ed. 1961).
0.03, at 417 (1949).
164 The author of a recent article on the Donovan case does not agree that an
injunction was necessary, although he criticizes the Court's broad denial of state
injunctive power. According to his view, the City of Dalfas had remedies other than
an injunction equally available to it, in the form of a plea for a stay, or res judicata,
in the federal court. See Arnold, State Power to Enjoin FederalProceedings, 51 VA. L.
REv. 59 (1965). If it is true that under Texas law the bonds could not issue in
either case, delaying any airport construction during appeals from either court or
decision, then this interpretation has merit. Even granting this fact, however, there
is still delay that can be created depending on who is appealing and who is the
plaintiff, which might have a bearing on the course chosen by the city in Donovan.
Moreover, the injunction obtained was a far more final remedy than dismissal in a
federal court since it barred all future efforts to contest this issue, and provided a
means for prompt and effective enforcement of the bar.
165 An additional fact in these cases was that under Texas law (VERNON's TEX.
Civ. STAT., art. 1269j-5, § 3 (1963)) as long as litigation was pending in which the
163 MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE
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siderations in such a case would seem far to outweigh the possible dangers
of interference, and state and federal courts in this case should be on
equal terms with respect to the anti-suit injunction.
2. Fraud or Collusion. In the fraud or collusion area, it would seem to
follow that where federal courts may enjoin the enforcement of state
court judgments which have been obtained through fraud, the state
courts should be able to do the same when faced with federal judgments
similarly obtained. Furthermore, state courts are not constrained by the
artificial distinction between completed and pending actions that exists
with regard to federal injunctive power because of the term "proceedings" in section 2283, and should be able to enjoin pending federal
proceedings upon a showing of irreparable harm resulting from fraud
in that suit. 166 Where the state court otherwise has jurisdiction over the
parties and subject matter of the federal suit, the injunction does not
frustrate national interests and the interference engendered should be
measured against the equitable factors underlying the injunction.
3. Public Policy. As a general proposition, state courts should not be
able to enjoin proceedings before a federal court for reasons of "public
policy." For although the federal court has such power in certain situations, 167 notions of reciprocity are not persuasive here. In most cases
in which the federal injunctive power is so justified, overriding national
interests are involved, and the supremacy clause is raised. In the nature
of things, there are no state equivalents to the "Act of Congress," removal or exclusive jurisdiction bases for such injunctions.
Nevertheless, cases can be posited in which a federal court is dearly
overstepping its jurisdiction and thus thwarting strong interests of the
state, with harm resulting both to the state in its sovereign capacity and
validity of a proposed bond issue was in any manner questioned, the Texas attorney
general could not authorize their sale, and thus any construction on the runway was
effectively stayed. It is significant in this regard that the complainants, when in the
federal court, no longer asked for a temporary injunction as in the state suit, but
only for a permanent injunction. The former goal was achieved by the mere institution of the suit. The Texas Supreme Court, noting this fact, stated that "there is
indication in the history of this matter that it has reached the point of vexatious
and harassing litigation." City of Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919, 927 (Tex. Sup. Ct.
1963).
166 See 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrxcE
60A0, at 648-52 (2d ed. 1955). This power,
of course, must be limited to situations where concurrent state and federal jurisdiction
exists, and not where the federal courts possess "exclusive jurisdiction." See also
Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915). See generally 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrCF
60.24, 60.36, 60.37, at 245-57, 601-35 (2d ed. 1955).
167 E.g., under the "Act of Congress" exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958), where
the United States brings the suit, where an unconstitutional statute is involved, or
where the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts is threatened.
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to certain of its citizens. In State v. Frost, for example, the State of
Wisconsin sought a state court injunction to prevent a receiver appointed
by a federal court from dismantling and totally destroying a Wisconsin
railroad pursuant to a mortgage foreclosure in the federal court. The
Wisconsin court did not rule on the issue of the injunction directly,
instead permitting removal to the federal court. 169 Previously, however,
the court did grant a temporary injunction pending full consideration
of the questions (1) whether the state may prevent destruction of a roadbed constructed under a state-authorized franchise and over which the
state had control in its sovereign capacity, and (2) whether "the right
of the public to the continued existence of such highway is fundamental
and superior to all rights of the corporation, either to exercise itself, or
to pledge, mortgage, or convey to others, so that a physical destruction
of that highway is a wrong against the public, which the state may
70

prevent."1

Similarly, in a diversity action where a federal court is applying state
law pursuant to the Erie doctrine, there is no valid reason for preventing
a court of another state from enjoining to prevent evasion of its own laws,
subject to the restrictions that exist between state courts in such
7
situations.1 '
4. Multiplicity of Actions and Concurrency. As in the state-state and
federal-state areas, state injunctions should not, as a rule, issue to bar
federal suits for purposes of avoiding a multiplicity of actions on the
same cause. However, the state court here is not bound by the provisions of a statute and situations may arise where the equitable needs
172
outweigh the evils of interference. In University of Texas v. Morris,
for example, an expelled student had brought a number of suits in
different courts against the University for his alleged wrongful discharge.
Indeed, the former student had threatened to continue suing "until death
do we part" in an effort to force the University to settle. 7 3 On the
defendant's motion, the Texas suits were consolidated and the plaintiff
was enjoined from prosecuting an additional suit in a federal court in
New Mexico. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the issuance of
168 113 Wis.

623, 89 N.W. 915 (1902).

The power of the state court to determine the elements necessary for federal
jurisdiction and to authorize removal was not considered by the court. However, all
the elements necessary for removal were thoroughly discussed. Still, the final decision
as to removal would have to be made by the federal court. There is no record of the
subsequent disposition or history of this case.
170 113 Wis. at 639, 89 N.W. at 917.
171 See Royal League v. Kavanagh, 233 II1. 175, 84 N.E. 178 (1908).
172 162 Tex. 60, 344 S.W.2d 426, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 978 (1961).
173 This information was contained in a letter written by the plaintiff to the
attorneys for the defendants. 162 Tex. at 63, 344 S.W.2d at 429.
169
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the injunction, stating that "a district court having jurisdiction of the
parties and the subject matter may enjoin a party from prosecuting a
cause of action in another court when such relief is necessary to prevent
a multiplicity of suits, avoid vexatious litigation, or prohibit the use
of the judicial processes for purposes of harassment."' 74 The court made
no mention of the state court prohibition, but it would seem that the
bar should have made no difference. When the jurisdiction of any court,
whether federal or state, is invoked for the purposes of harassment or
oppression, the goals of non-interference should yield to the equitable
justifications for the anti-suit injunction.
CONCLUSION

Writing on the federal abstention doctrine, Professor Kurland has
stated: "It seems to me that if we can only rid ourselves of the notion of
contest between the state and federal courts, as well as among state
courts; if we can substitute therefor a concept of co-operative federalism,
we can come closer to the constitutional ideal."' 7 This notion is also
applicable to the and-suit injunction. The chief objection to the injunction has been that it engenders friction between courts, resulting at
times in a virtual power struggle, which aggravates rather than settles
176

conflicts.
Between federal and state courts, these problems are especially acute,
and the "independence" of the two judicial systems cannot be lightly
disregarded. However, this comment has suggested that in certain areas
the anti-suit injunction may be employed without seriously affecting the
desired independence. Indeed, it has been suggested that the elimination
of the current double standard may serve to enhance, rather than
diminish, progress toward the goal of a "co-operative federalism." Nevertheless, once these propositions are accepted, further problems remain.
Because the anti-suit injunction is operative only against the party
enjoined, and not the foreign court, there is always the possibility that
the injunction will be ignored and that the foreign court will proceed
to hear the suit "enjoined." Since decisions have generally upheld the
proposition that a court is not bound to give full faith and credit to
174 162 Tex. at 62, 344 S.W.2d at 428. The Texas court regarded the number
of suits instituted and the time over which these had been brought as important
in establishing the motive to vex and harass, noting that "had Morris instituted
but two suits, one in Texas and a later one in New Mexico, there undoubtedly would
have existed a lack of equity." Ibid.
175 Kurland, Toward a Co-operative JudicialFederalism: The Federal Court A bstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 492 (1960).
176 Id. at 489.
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the injunction, 177 the equitable reasons underlying the injunction may be
thwarted, with a resulting increase in the tension between the respective
courts. In many cases, the threat of contempt citations, or further injunctions by the enjoining court, will serve to deter the enjoined party and
thus alleviate these dangers.1' 8 However, in some cases real conflict arises
if the second court decides to enjoin the party with the injunction from
proceeding elsewhere" 79 or to counter-enjoin the enforcement of the
injunction. 8 0 In such cases, the dignity of the respective courts is
damaged, all notions of comity and mutual respect upset, and, most of
all, innocent parties are placed in painful dilemmas.
Fortunately, these extremes have seldom resulted.' 8 ' Ideally, the second
court should respect the anti-suit injunction of the first and dismiss or
stay the action before it, if only for reasons of comity.18 2 Since the injunc177 Wells v. Wells, 230 Ala. 430, 161 So. 794 (1935); James v. Grand Trunk West.
R.R., 14 Ill. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958); Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385
(1922); State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 168 N.W. 589 (1918).
See generally Comment, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 552 (1961); Comment, 26 U. CHi. L. Ray.
633 (1959).
178 Note, 27 IowA L. REv. 76, 80 (1941).
179 See Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 625 (1849), where the Court, stating
the rule that the court first taking jurisdiction can settle all matters to the exclusion
of all other courts, noted "for if one [court] may enjoin, the other may retort by
injunction, and thus -the parties be without remedy; being liable to a process for
contempt in one, if they dare to proceed in the other." This case involved a proceeding in rem, however. The actual problem of injunction-injunction has never arisen
in practice, and probably never will, due to the residency requirements for an
injunction to be issued and considerations of comity.
180 Chicago, Wf. & St. Paul Ry. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (8th Cir. 1923); James
v. Grand Trunk West. R.R., 14 Ill. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958); Peterson v.
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 187 Minn. 228, 244 N.W. 823 (1932). The James case furnishes
an excellent example of the extremes to which a court may go. The Illinois Supreme
Court held that the Illinois trial court should issue a counter-injunction to bar the
enforcement of an injunction obtained by the Michigan defendant in Michigan to
bar the Illinois suit. All parties were from Michigan, the cause had arisen there,
and suit was brought under the Michigan wrongful death act, which contained
"venue" provisions requiring that suit be brought in a county through which the
tracks of the railroad ran, here in Michigan. The court stated: "However, this court
need not, and will not, countenance having its right to try cases, of which it has
proper jurisdiction, determined by the courts of other States, through their injunctive
process. We are not only free to disregard such out-of-State injunctions, and to
adjudicate the merits of the pending action, but we can protect our jurisdiction
from such usurpation by the issuance of a counter-injunction restraining the enforcement of the out-of-State injunction." 14 Ill. 2d at 372, 152 N.E.2d at 867. There was
a vigorous dissent on this latter point by Justice Schaefer. Id. at 374-75, 152 N.E.2d
at 868
181 Southern Ry. v. Painter, 314 U.S. 155 (1941) (counter-injunction denied); Bryant
v. Atlantic Coast R.R., 92 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1937) (L. Hand, J., counter-injunction
denied); State ex rel. New York, C. & St. L.R.R. v. Nortoni, 331 Mo. 764, 55 S.W.2d
272 (1932) (counter-injunction denied).
182 See Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 294 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1961); Allen v.
Chicago G.W.R.R., 239 Ill. App. 38, 43 (1925).
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tion is an extreme remedy, and one that courts employ with caution and
only to prevent immediate and irreparable harm, the second court should
defer to the judgment of the first.
Within the bounds of strict comity between federal and state courts,
the limited use of the anti-suit injunction seems desirable. It is as important in the federal-state area as it is in the state-state area that
courts be able to protect their jurisdiction, their judgments, and parties
over whom they are equitably responsible. Where the equitable or policy
bases for an injunction outweigh the dangers of "interference," such
injunctions should issue, regardless of whether the suit enjoined is
"federal" or "state." The goal of "co-operative federalism" can only be
achieved through equality and mutual respect, neither of which is
furthered by the present double standard.

